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The Market for Human Smuggling into Europe:  
A Macro Perspective 
 
 
The public discourse on human smuggling into the European Union often evokes the 
presence of a few all-powerful “Mr Bigs” who are able to “mastermind” illegal 
operations. This paper takes a closer look at the recent trends in relation to two key 
smuggling routes – the Eastern and the Central Mediterranean – with the aim to identify 
the analytical and empirical features of the markets for smuggling services. It shows that 
these markets have the ability to expand considerably and often over a short period of 
time. It then argues that this is consistent with the presence of many competitive 
enterprises, low barriers to entry, low skills and (relatively) low capital requirements. 
This is a far cry from how the public discourse is often framed. The costs to the 
smugglers of monitoring agents and clients are also likely to be modest – particularly in 
comparison with human trafficking. The paper concludes by discussing some policy 
implications, including the adoption of land-based policies (regarded as more effective 
than naval operations) and a suggestion for a change in the terminology adopted in 
policy and intelligence reports.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Framing criminal markets as dominated by a few ‘Mr Bigs’ able to ‘mastermind’ illegal 
operations is often too tempting. Migrant smuggling is no exception. A handful of 
headlines that have recently appeared in the British press gives us a sense of the public 
discourse around the issue: “The pistol-packing Mr Big growing fat on migrants who will 
do anything to reach Britain” was adopted by the Daily Mail when introducing a report 
on a smuggler based in Turkey (25/8/2015); “Migrant Mr Big exposed: Birmingham 
gangster who smuggles thousands of illegals into the UK in 24 hour a day operation” 
wrote The Sun when reporting on an ‘exclusive’ investigation on human smuggling 
(8/2/2016). This view is not a prerogative of tabloids: “Liverpool asylum seeker is 
mastermind of Europe's largest people smuggling operation” wrote The Telegraph 
(4/12/2015) while The Times printed “Spies trace ‘Mr Big of people trafficking’ ” 
(9/6/2016; the label ‘people trafficking’ is erroneously employed in lieu of ‘smuggling’). 
The terms ‘mafia’ and ‘godfather’ have also been used in connection with this 
phenomenon: “Calais migrant crisis: ‘English mafia’ trafficking people to UK” one could 
read on the BBC (14/8/2015), and “Exposed: The Godfathers of a £20bn trade in people 
smuggling” wrote The Mirror (23/4/2015). The latter also reads: “the boss of illegal 
immigration in the country [Turkey] is alleged to be Muammer Küçük, the kingpin of a 
major organisation spanning borders and languages like no other. Küçük’s gang controls 
movements in the Bosphorus, one of the world’s most strategic waterways, connecting 
the Black sea to the Mediterranean” (23/4/2015; italics added).  The implication is that 
each of these kingpins can exert some sort of monopolistic control over a certain route. 
However, does this stand up to a close empirical scrutiny? Furthermore, the extent of 
the illegal migration flows (see next section for details) and the resulting wide-ranging 
implications for policy-makers and law enforcement agencies alike make it crucial to 
take a closer look at what has just happened at the EU external border, and particularly 
at its southern border (Italy and Greece). This work will seek to explore the analytical 
features of the market for smuggling services by analysing the macro-level evidence on 
illegal border crossings into the European Union in the last five years. This analysis will 
be supplemented with additional qualitative evidence. This, in turn, will offer policy-
makers an analytical base upon which to build future – and better targeted – policy 
responses. 
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2. The market for smuggling services 
 
Illegal migration into the European Union is hardly a new phenomenon. Nonetheless, 
the magnitude of the illegal migration flows witnessed by the bloc has registered a steep 
increase in the past few years – particularly at its southern border. According to the 
figures released by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), some 1.6 
million illegal border crossings have been recorded in the last five years (2010-15) just 
at the Greek and Italian borders. Behind this figure there is an equal number of personal 
stories of people moving out of their own country for a variety of reasons. Often these 
are stories of individuals leaving war zones, poverty or economic hardship. As 
important (and sometimes tragic) as they may be, the study of the motivations to 
migrate is beyond the scope of this paper. The aim of this work is to explore some 
analytical and empirical features of the market for smuggling services that underpins 
such movement.  It moves from the assumption that border crossings are a good proxy 
for the size of the market for smuggling services. Given that border crossings at the EU 
southern borders are hardly ever made without the assistance of smugglers (Int-3 and 
Int-4), this is a reasonable assumption.  
 
This paper interprets human smuggling as an illegal trade in which the commodity 
traded is primarily the illegal entry into a country (Campana and Varese 2016; 
Kleemans 2011). This sets smuggling apart from human trafficking as in the latter case 
the commodity traded is primarily control over a person (see Campana and Varese 2016 
for a discussion). Trade normally takes place in a market, which, by definition, is 
characterised by supply and demand. In this specific instance, migrants constitute the 
demand-side of the market. They are willing to buy a service, i.e. illegal entry into a 
country, for a variety of reasons that we shall not explore further (e.g., leaving war 
zones, poverty, economic hardship or persecution). The demand for smuggling services 
is satisfied by a number of sellers. In this specific market, sellers are collectively defined 
as smugglers. The focus of this paper is on the supply-side of the market. (More broadly, 
this works follows, among others, Schelling 1971; Reuter 1983 and 1985; Gambetta 
1993; Varese 2001; Shortland and Varese 2014 in its economic approach to the study of 
illegal markets). Furthermore, the analysis shall focus on the Greek and the Italian 
borders to minimise potential biases related to the thorny issue of double-counting that 
affects the data on the Balkan and the Albanian route; the Albanian and the Balkan 
illegal border crossings are – potentially to a very large extent – a subset of the Italian 
and Greek illegal border crossings. When the Balkan and Albanian routes are excluded, 
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the Greek and the Italian borders constantly account for more than 90% of all illegal 
border crossings detected at the EU level during the period under consideration.  
The evidence for this paper has been extracted from a number of official reports 
released by Frontex (see References for details) and has been supplemented with four 
semi-structured interviews carried out with Frontex analysts (see Appendix A for 
details). During these interviews, I was able to gather additional qualitative evidence as 
well as to discuss potential biases in the data collection strategy adopted by Frontex and 
EU Member States.  
 
 
3. Human smuggling into the EU: Macro-level trends 
 
In the EU terminology, illegal border crossings into Greece and Italy are normally 
referred to as, respectively, the Eastern Mediterranean route (this also includes the 
Aegean Sea) and the Central Mediterranean route (this also includes the Ionian Sea and 
Malta). Figure 1 offers an overview of the number of illegal border crossings for these 
two routes during the last five years. It is worth recalling here that, from an analytical 
point of view, ‘illegal border crossing’ is the commodity supplied by smugglers. For ease 
of reading, I will henceforth refer to this commodity as IBC.  
 
 
Figure 1. Illegal Border Crossings (2010-2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
885,386 (2015) 
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Both the Central Mediterranean route and, even more remarkably, the Eastern 
Mediterranean route have shown a considerable increase in the last two years. The rate 
of change year-on-year gives us a further indication of the extent of the growth 
experienced by these markets. The number of IBCs along the Eastern Mediterranean 
route increased by 1,641% from 2014 to 2015. This translates into 885,386 illegal 
entries in 2015 compared to 50,834 in the previous year (+834,552).  IBCs also 
increased remarkably along the Central Mediterranean route: +199% between 2012 and 
2013 followed by +277% (2013-14). Interestingly, this route also recorded a +1,344% 
year-on-year change between 2010 and 2011: this is a level of growth similar to the one 
registered by the Eastern Mediterranean route in 2015.1 In other words, the ability of 
the market for smuggling services to grow by such very high rates does not appear to be 
a specificity of a single route. When favourable conditions arise, the market for IBCs is 
quick to expand. Figure 2 offers a more fine-grained picture based on quarterly data. To 
take into account the seasonality of the phenomenon (mostly due to weather and sea 
conditions), each quarter is compared to the same quarter of the previous year.  
 
 
Figure 2. IBCs: Rate of change for Central Mediterranean (grey) and Eastern 
Mediterranean (black), Q1 2012 – Q2 2016. 
 
Note: percentage of change year-on-year for each quarter.  
 
 
                                                        
1 Although from a lower base: from 4,450 to 64,241 IBCs.   
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The ability of the market for IBCs to expand quickly is confirmed by the quarterly 
analysis. For instance, between Q4/14 and Q4/15, IBCs in the Eastern Mediterranean 
route increased by 3,011%. This is reflected in the absolute number of IBCs: they rose 
from 14,152 in Q1/15 to 68,168 the following quarter (+678% year-on-year), then to 
319,146 in Q3/15 (+1,329% y-on-y) and finally to 483,910 in Q4/15 (+3,011% y-on-y). 
The picture also shows the likely effect of the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
agreement that came into force in the second half of March 2016 – notice the slowdown 
in Q1/16 and the negative growth in Q2/16 compared to Q2/15 (-87%).2 It is worth 
noting here that the EU-Turkey agreement is mostly based on a set of land-based 
policies (as opposed to naval operations such as the ones carried out in the Central 
Mediterranean).3  
 
 
4. Further evidence on the market for smuggling services 
 
Frontex dispatches teams to collect first-hand information from migrants at the time of 
their first arrival on European soil (Int-1 and Int-2). Member states are also feeding to 
Frontex analyst intelligence collected from interviews with migrants (Int-1 and Int-2). 
Part of this intelligence relates to the structure of the smuggling markets. While I did not 
have first-hand access to the intelligence collected by Frontex and individual Member 
States, Frontex analysts were able to discuss with me aspects of the market structure.  
According to an operational analyst who is assigned to the Eastern Mediterranean route, 
there is evidence of a multiplicity of smuggling networks operating on this route; in 
addition, these networks appear to compete against each other (Int-3).4 The analyst 
maintains that, “when a new route opens, very soon they [the existing networks] will 
have competition” (Int-3).  
                                                        
2 The EU-Turkey agreement appears to have fallen short of completely “shutting down” the 
Eastern Mediterranean route, as 172,982 IBCs were still recorded between January and 
September 2016 (the latest data available from Frontex). These partial figures show a 
considerable decrease over the 2015 peak (885,386 IBCs), but this is still a higher level of IBCs 
compared to 2014 (50,834, see Figure 1). Broadly speaking, this agreement has brought the 
Eastern Mediterranean route in line with the Central Mediterranean route (the latter recorded 
127,599 IBCs between January and September 2016).  
3 Amenta et al. (2016) have tested the effect of naval operations on the market for smuggling 
services in the Central Mediterranean, and have concluded that Operation Mare Nostrum and its 
replacements appear to have increased the departures from Libya.  
4 For a discussion of the term ‘network’, see Campana (2016b).  
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The behaviour of individual actors offers some evidence of the low barrier to entry in 
smuggling markets. According to the same operational analyst, there are numerous 
recorded instances of individuals that have entered the market after spotting an 
opportunity for profit (Int-3). These individuals can assume a variety of roles. For 
instance, some have approached migrants on long-distance buses directed to Istanbul 
and “advertised” the service of a certain network of smugglers (Int-3). Moreover, there 
are reported cases of street vendors who have started selling smuggling services 
alongside their original products. Most of these sellers, however, do not seem to be fully-
fledged members of any specific organisation or bound by an exclusivity clause in their 
agreement with a network of smugglers (Int-3). This would make these actors similar to 
independent insurance or mortgage brokers. If interpreted in this way, the label that is 
often used to describe this role is misleading. In policy reports and intelligence 
documents, they are often referred to as “recruiters”; however, “brokers” would seem a 
more appropriate term (I interpret “broker” as an independent agent who arranges 
transactions between a buyer and a seller for a commission).  
Furthermore, the evidence collected by Frontex also suggests that, during the sudden 
expansion of the Eastern Mediterranean route in 2015, new groups appear to have 
entered the market (Int-3; Int-4). “The networks that were already there were no longer 
able to cope with the demand” explains an operational analyst (Int-4). According to the 
same analyst, these new groups entered the market “as fast as they [could]” (Int-4). For 
instance, fishermen started to get more and more involved in smuggling operations: “if 
you carry 20 people in a boat, that could be the equivalent of five bad years of fishing” 
(Int-4). Similar instances have been recorded in relation to the Central Mediterranean 
route. For instance, a Joint Report Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community indicates that 
in Agadez – a key hub in Niger located on the route from West Africa to Libya – “the 
steady demise of regular tourism prompted many former tour guides to switch and 
cater for the transiting migrants” (Frontex 2016a: 26).  
 
Crucially, smuggling networks do not appear to have any sort of territorial control over 
the Turkish coast: “today they may try from one city, tomorrow from a complete 
different one” notes an operational analyst (Int-3). This supports the idea that, for such a 
market to expand at a very high rate, there must be no monopolistic control. Intelligence 
collected in Agadez points in the same direction: “the smuggling service industry is not 
controlled by one person or group”, states the Joint Report by the Africa-Frontex 
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Intelligence Community (Frontex 2016a: 6).5 Preliminary findings from an empirical in-
depth study of the network underpinning smuggling operations between the Horn of 
Africa and Northern Europe via Libya and Italy (the Central Mediterranean route) show 
no indication of monopolistic control over the market at any stage along the route.  
Rather, there seems to be a high degree of competition among largely independent and 
autonomous smugglers (Campana 2016c; incidentally, there is no indication of any 
involvement of the Sicilian Mafia in smuggling activities taking place in Sicily).  
 
In addition, smugglers may have to face radical changes in the composition of the 
demand due to migrants switching between routes. For example, the number of Syrian 
migrants arriving in Italy went up from 11,307 in 2013 to 42,323 in 2014 and then 
dropped to 7,448 in 2015 (IOM 2015: 73; IOM 2016:17).6  Arguably, this drop was the 
consequence of a change in smuggling decisions made by the migrants. If we look at the 
share of Syrian nationals among the migrants arriving in Italy, this was stable in 2013 
and 2014 – respectively 26% and 25% - and then dropped to less then 5% in 2015 (IOM 
2015: 73; IOM 2016: 17). At the same time, the Eastern Mediterranean route boomed 
(see figure 1) with some 436,000 Syrians arriving in Greece in 2015 (51.6% of the total: 
IOM 2016: 10).7 As smuggling operations tend to have a potentially large ethnic 
component (Int-3), changes in the demand-side are likely to have an impact on the 
supply-side. This potentially translates into new smugglers entering a market when the 
demand generated by migrants from the same nationality/ethnicity increases and/or 
smugglers relocating their operations following a shift in demand. Both patterns are 
hard to reconcile with a situation of high barriers to entry.  
Finally, to support sudden and sizeable expansions in the market, smugglers and 
migrants alike need to rely on an infrastructure that is able to handle transnational 
payments and is equally flexible. According to many sources, the hawala system appears 
to perform this role well, and it is a popular choice among actors looking for a financial 
infrastructure to support smuggling-related transactions (Int-3; Int-4. On hawala more 
generally, see Varese 2015; van de Bunt 2008).  
 
 
5. Theoretical implications 
                                                        
5 According to the same Joint Report, roughly 100,000 West African migrants were estimated to 
be in transit through Agadez en route to Libya in 2015. These numbers were considered to be “as 
much as four times higher compared to the period prior to 2011” (Frontex 2016a: 26).  
6 This is a self-declared nationality. 
7 The figure reported by Frontex for the same route is slightly higher: 496,290 IBCs by Syrian 
nationals; the quota, however, is very similar: 58.4%.  
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What are the analytical implications of the evidence discussed? The five-year trends in 
smuggling activities presented above suggest that markets for smuggling services are 
able to grow considerably and often over a relatively short period of time. Such an 
ability to expand in response to changes in external factors (i.e. higher demand and/or 
lower pressure from law enforcement agencies) does not seem to be confined to a single 
route. In fact, both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Central Mediterranean routes 
have registered similar percentage increases at different points during the last five 
years. It is worth noting that we are considering here only “successful” IBCs, i.e. 
situations in which the smugglers have managed to successfully deliver the services they 
promised (we leave aside here considerations about the quality, safety and price of 
these services). The volume of activities generated by scammers and inept smugglers is 
not counted. The number of IBCs is therefore an indication of the level of successful 
market exchanges. So, what characteristics should a market possess in order to achieve 
an output that is consistent with the pattern described above? 
To answer this question, one would need to collect data on the organisational 
arrangements and the behaviour of smugglers in each of the routes considered. I plan to 
do so in greater detail in future works (see Campana 2016c for a first step in this 
direction). Still, some preliminary reflections on the analytical features of the market for 
smuggling services can be drawn based on the macro-level trends as well as the 
qualitative evidence presented. 
Firstly, the absence of large monopolies. Arguably, monopolies would find it hard to 
satisfy such a sudden and vast increase in demand for their services. On the contrary, 
the trends in smuggling activities described seem to be consistent with a situation of 
market competition, i.e. a condition under which buyers and sellers are free to enter a 
given market.  
Secondly, assuming that a large number of new smugglers have indeed entered the 
market to satisfy the large and sudden increase in demand, the implication is that these 
markets are likely to have low barriers to entry.  
Thirdly, the high rate of growth suggests that the level of resources required for an actor 
to successfully enter the market or for an existing actor to expand his operations is 
likely to be relatively low. These resources include skills and capital requirements. For 
incumbents, the set-up costs are also likely to be relatively low.  
Finally, I have argued elsewhere (Campana 2016a) that one of the key factors hindering 
the growth of human trafficking organisations is (high) monitoring costs. Acquiring 
control over a victim with the purpose of exploitation entails a high degree of 
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monitoring (on monitoring costs more generally, see Reuter 1983 and 1985). Although 
not directly comparable, a parallel reading of the data on IBCs and non-EU victims of 
human trafficking identified in the European Union immediately shows that the two 
phenomena manifest themselves at a different level of magnitude: on average, 2,198 
Non-EU victims of trafficking were identified between 2010 and 2012 (these are the 
most recent figures available at the EU level: see Eurostat 2015: 39; cf. Figure 1)8. The 
expectation is that monitoring costs in the case of human smuggling are drastically 
lower than in the case of trafficking. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This paper has taken a closer look at macro-level trends in human smuggling into the 
European Union to tease out some analytical and empirical features of the market for 
smuggling services. It has focused on two main routes: the Eastern Mediterranean route 
and the Central Mediterranean route. It has shown that, in both cases, the market was 
able to grow considerably and often over a relatively short period of time. This paper 
then conjectured that, for a market to be able to achieve such an outcome, it needs to 
possess at least some of the following features: firstly, the absence of large monopolies. 
The existence of market arrangements more geared towards competition seems to be 
consistent with the trends observed and the preliminary evidence presented. Secondly, 
the presence of low barriers to entry. This includes low skills and (relatively) low capital 
requirements; newcomers are likely to face relatively low set-up costs. Furthermore, 
monitoring costs are in all probability limited, particularly when compared to related 
phenomena such as human trafficking. These features constitute a major departure from 
how human smuggling is framed in the public discourse. Moreover, a key element is the 
existence of an infrastructure to support financial transactions that is able to match and 
adapt to sudden changes in the smuggling market. The hawala system appears to 
possess this quality. The paper has also offered some preliminary qualitative evidence 
mostly gathered through interviews with Frontex analysts that supports the analytical 
implications derived from the macro-level quantitative analysis.   
What policy implications can be drawn from the discussion above? First of all, let me 
make clear that I shall not discuss the moral and political dimensions of migration and 
migration policies: this goes beyond the scope of this paper. In a context in which States 
                                                        
8 Non-EU victims of Human Trafficking identified in the European Union were 2,421 in 2010, 
2,002 in 2011 and 2,171 in 2012 (Eurostat 2015: 39).    
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aim to minimise illegal migration, the ability of the market for smuggling services to 
grow exponentially and over a relatively short period of time poses a dramatic challenge 
for law enforcement authorities and States alike. The presence of low barriers to entry 
and a competitive environment means that the market can meet sudden surges in 
demand but, also, that the void created by the arrest of a single smuggler can quickly be 
filled by other actors. Policing human smuggling is made even more challenging by the 
possibility for migrants to switch from one route to another. This casts some doubts 
over, for example, the probability that the EU naval operation in the Mediterranean, the 
so-called “Operation Sophia” (EUNAVFOR MED), will actually manage to achieve its 
declared goal to tackle human smuggling through “the boarding, search, seizure and 
diversion of smugglers' vessels on the high seas” (EUEA 2016: 1).9 Shortland and Varese 
(2014) have suggested that the best way to fight piracy in Somalia is to adopt a land-
based solution that involves working with communities. Land-based policies also seem 
to be equally more effective than sea operations in the case of human smuggling (see, 
e.g., the preliminary evidence regarding the EU-Turkey agreement). In addition, 
smugglers appear to be rational actors who enter this market when the opportunities 
arise and the benefits outweigh the costs. Therefore, working on the structure of 
incentives (and disincentives) in transit countries may prove to be an effective strategy 
in reducing the size of the market for IBCs.  
Furthermore, there are indications that the market appears to be more demand-driven 
than supply-driven. This supports the adoption of wider policies that reduce the 
necessity to migrate and/or to rely on the smuggling market when needed. For instance, 
the adoption of schemes that resettle refugees directly from war-torn zones would be a 
step in this direction.   
Finally, policy and intelligence analysts may wish to rethink the way they use the term 
“recruiter” and possibly adopt the label “broker” to describe the role performed by 
independent actors who advertise and sell smuggling services that they do not directly 
provide. (In a demand-driven market, “recruiter” does not seem to be an appropriate 
label in any case).  
This paper is a preliminary attempt to offer an analytical reflection on the features of the 
market for smuggling services in relation to two smuggling routes. Its findings are 
therefore limited to these routes and the time-period observed; future comparative 
                                                        
9 Without adopting an Australian-type policy of towing intercepted boats back to a third country 
(incidentally, this was done by Italy on May 6, 2009; the European Court of Human Rights ruled 
the push back of boats to Libya to be illegal on February 23, 2012, see Hirsi Jamaa and others v. 
Italy, 27765/09). There is little doubt about the ability of “Operation Sophia” to provide 
humanitarian assistance to migrants – which is, indeed, a very noble task. 
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research across routes and over time is certainly needed. Secondly, this work can be 
complemented and extended by moving from the macro-level to the group level (meso-
level) and the individual level (micro-level). I plan to explore these two levels in more 
detail in future works.  
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